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THE YEARS OF REFORM IN CHINA : ECONOMIC GROWTH VERSUS 
MODERNIZATION 
I-Chuan WU-BEYENS 
In December 1978, after a period of intense power struggle 
and following a discussion among the top leaders, the Chinese 
Communist Party announced solemnly that the focus of its work 
will no longer be class struggle but should be replaced by 
economic development. Thus started the reforms which have 
made China socio-economically fundamentally different in 
many ways from the day Chairman Mao Zedong died. 
However, the political essence of the regime appears to be hard 
to modify. 
The economic reform has brought about significant 
improvements in the level of living standards of most Chinese 
and impressive economic growth rates have been registered. 
The table shows the comparison of some of the economic 
indexes before and after the reform. The "success" of China's 
economic reform has received much praises. However, we think 
that the outcome of these ten years of important changes can 
best be qualified as "economic growth" rather than 
"development". Furthermore, it is our opinion that in many 
ways the goal of "modernization" is even more difficult to be 
attained after this ten years of unbalanced and lopsided 
growth. Behind the flourishing facade of Chinese society lies a 
multitude of problems. In analysing these problems it is hoped 
that the remarkable events which started to unfold in April 
1989, as well as the enourmous stakes involved in the outcome 
of China's future political development could be better 
understood. 
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Table 
COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC INDEXES BEFORE AND AFTER 
REFORM OF 1978 
(1952-78) 
Annual rate 
of growth 
1952 1978 
1. National income (NDMP) billion yuan ( a ) 58.9 301 65 
2. Total value of industry production-billion 34.9 406.7 9.9 
yuan(a) 
3. Heavy industry production-bilbon yuan(a) 12.4 231.4 11.9 
4. Light industry production-billion yuan(a) 22.5 173.3 82 
5. Total value of agricultural production- 46.1 156.7 4.8 
billion yuan(a) 
6. Total value of agricultural output billion 46.1 128.9 4.0 
yuan(b) 
7. Amount of food grain productin-unprocessed 163.9 304.8 2.4 
million tons 
8. Population-yearly average million persons(c) 574.8 962.6 2.0 
9. Per capita food grain output-unprocessed, kg 285.1 316.6 0.4 
10.Per capita national income (yuan)(a) 104 315 4.4 
Sources : 
1952, 1978 and 1984 from State Statistical Bureau, State Council of People's Republic of 
China, ed. Zhongguo Tongij Nianjian, 1985, (Statiscal Yearbook People's Republic of 
China), (Beijing : Zhongguo Tongji chubanshe, October 1985). 
1988 : "Communique on fulfilment of China's 1988 National Economic Plan", Beijing 
Review no. 10 (March 6-12, 1989). 
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Table 
COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC INDEXES BEFORE AND AFTER 
REFORM OF 1978 
(1978-84) (1984-88) 
Annual rate Annual rate Annual rate 
of growth of growth of growth 
1984 1988 1978-89 1952-88 
564.3 11 1.153.3 19.6 14.4 8.6 
704.2 9.6 1.810 26.6 16.1 11.6 
370.7 8.2 915 23.3 14.7 12.7 
333.5 113 895 28.0 17.7 10.8 
375.5 15.7 561.8 353 13.6 7.2 
280.1 13.8 261.2 -1.6 73 4.9 
4073 5 394.0 -0.8 26 25 
1.034.8 1.2 1.096.1 1.45 1.3 1.8 
393.6 3.7 359.5 -2.1 1.3 0.6 
548 9.7 1.052 7.7 12.8 6.6 
Notes : Annual rate of growth is derived as a compound annual rate of growth between 
the years at both ends of the phase indicated. 
Remark : like most developing countries the quality of China's statistics present 
various reliability, the biggest problem is that of the population total where serious 
under-registration of births, especially in the last ten years is known. However, this 
figures show the general trend of development and are basically the same set of 
statistics used by the Chinese government in planning. 
Per capita figure is derived from the yearly population average and the national figure. 
(a) Price of that year 
(b) = Total value of agricultural production - total value of non-agricultural production 
(c) The figures include the population and army men in the service of the 29 provinces 
municipalities and autonomous regions on the mainland, but not those of Taiwan 
Province. 
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This article is divided into four parts. We start with the 
discussion of the evolution of the economic reform. It shows 
that the adaptation of the popular 'responsibility system' and its 
application in the urban areas and industrial sector had 
changed the nature of the 'reform' into a formidable movement 
of seeking 'economic gains' in every level of the society, and 
that the peasants who had benefitted from the first stage of the 
reform turned quickly into victims of the system. In the second 
part we analyse more specifically problems arisen form these 
changes, other than various socio-economic issues, the most 
important ills coming from the confusion between official and 
private activities. 
The section of inherent limitation of reform shows that the 
mistakes were not accidental. The non-systematic approach 
towards the reform finds its origin in the voluntaristic nature 
which marks China's Communist Party all through its history, 
and shows also that the political implications which hindered 
the progress of the reform and much resented by the people are 
the results of the party's determination to hold on to absolute 
power. Economic retrenchment is the logical outcome of such 
an attitude. In the concluding section we point out the major 
problematic outcomes of the reform which furthered China 
from her pronounced goal of 'modernizing' herself. but we also 
point out that some hope exists for the future. 
Stages of Reform 
Although the reforms have been desired by the new 
leadership after 1978, much of the direction of its development 
has not been intended or planned by the government. A brief 
account of the stages of its development would shed light on the 
basic ideas, the compromises and obstacles, and the outcome of 
these ten years of reform. 
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One of the major decisions taken in the end of 1978 was to 
release the pent up productivity by giving more initiatives to 
enterprises and individuals through relaxing the central planning. 
Much of the economic powers have been given to local 
government and, in the same spirit, a major reajustment of rural 
distribution and management has been called for. The reform of 
the agricultural sector has been singled out from the outset. The 
procurement prices of agricultural products had been raised after 
decades of stagnation 1 , and the pre-Cultural Revolutionary 
"liberties" of private plot, free market and familly sidelines have 
been reencouraged. Under this new political atmosphere, the 
"household responsibility" system which has already existed in 
some areas well before 1979 have been quickly adopted all over the 
countryside. 
Finally sanctioned offically by the Document No. 1 of the 
central committee of the Communis t Party, in 1983, the 
responsibility system reinstated households as the basic 
autonomous economic units. Rural households have total 
organizational and management power over the land they till and 
over their labour force deployment. They have to sell a quota of 
the agricultural products at a reasonable level and a large fraction 
at above quota price to the State via the rural collectives. With the 
different working organization and management plus the raise of 
governmental purchasing prices, agricultural productivities 
increased very rapidly. The annual growth rate of total value of 
agricultural production of 1978-1984 was more than three times 
higher than between 1952 and 1978. See Table. A wide range of 
diversified culture has replaced the drive for grain production of 
the last twenty years 2 . Numerous rural enterprises have been set 
up with surplus funds and redundant labour force. Various service 
trades flourished and commerce can no longer be contained within 
rural markets. 
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The moving situations obliged the government to legalize a 
large number of practices, such as allowing people to be 
detached from economic activities organized by the rural 
collectives, formation of special ized farm or non-farm 
households, employment of workers or apprentices, conducting 
inter administrative areas trades, and the organization of joint 
economic activities out of the collective framework. The shape 
of rural reform has largely been created from the "bottom up" 
rather than from the "top down". Most of the time the 
governmental function has been limited to legitimating 
practices which have proven profitable. Policies such as the 
formal obliteration of the People's Commune between 1982 and 
1984, the extremely effective political control organ of the 
Party, turn out to be the exact contrary of the original intention 
which was to reinforce the rural collectives. 
1984 marked a turning point in Chinese economic reform. 
The part of economy under central "planning" was further 
reduced and the reform of the industrial and urban sectors after 
the rural "responsibility" model was pressed forward. One of 
the important factor in this decision is the bumper harvest of 
most of the major farm crops in 1984. After three years of high 
growth, the total grain output bypassed the mark of 400 million 
tons for the first time. The government found it more and more 
difficult financially to meet the obligation of purchasing, at the 
same time the problems of s torage, processing and 
transportation have become more and more acute. In order to 
discharge the state of the responsibility of obligatory farm 
procurement and to enliven the market levers, the authority 
introduced a contractual purchase system in 1985. Contracts are 
established between the government and the peasants for the 
purchasing of part of 1984's production level and multiple price 
system was replaced with a single price at the average 
procurement price of the prior year. 
107 
Under the new situations the peasants have to sustain 
pressures from both ensuring themselves the sale of their 
surplus on the one hand, and on the other hand, the rising of 
productive cost and shortage of productive materials which 
come with the generalization of the responsibility system' in all 
economic sector. The reduced investment in the early stage of 
the reform and the decontrolling of prices which followed have 
rendered many farm implements, such as seeds, fertilizer, 
machineries, and plastic membranes very expensive 3 or even in 
dire shortage. The "double track" economic system and the 
often liberal interpretation of the contract terms enables cadres 
and officals to illegal profits and further complicate the position 
of the peasants. Furthermore, without a powerful local 
organizations most of the important public investments such as 
water conservation and irrigation started to deteriorate. 
The growth of output value of farm production started to 
slowdown, from 7.2 percent in 1978-84 to 3 and 3.5. % in 1985 
and 1986. And the production costs continue to rise. The sown 
areas for grain has been reduced and the peasants turn to the 
production of much more lucrative activities. The shortage of 
foodgrain was soon felt. The government had to start again to 
import large amount of grain after 1985. And with the rise of 
prices of animal feeds, the scanty supply of certain food forced 
the government to reinstall the system of ration in some cities in 
1987. Although rural workshops and small factories were also 
similarly affected, the processing of agricultural products or 
rudimental extract industries remained the most important 
alternative income powers for the rural population. In 1987 the 
non-farm output value bypassed the farm output value in 
China's rural areas for the first time. Nevertheless, large 
numbers of rural surplus population flow to the urban areas in 
seeking of a better living. It is estimated that by early 1989 there 
were some 50 millions of them. 
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Between 1979 and 1984 during the first stage of reform in 
industrial and urban sector the measures adopted tends to 
simplify planning, and by authorizing enterprises to sell freely 
products above the plan target. Enterprises were allowed to 
retain profits from such selling. This proved to have little effect 
on overall economic growth (see Table ) . In October 1984 the 
Central Committee decided to press on with the process. The 
scope of "imperative planning" has been drastically cut down, 
the profit delivery was replaced by tax payment, and greater 
management power was to be delegated to the directors. 
Together with the gradual reform since 1979 the number of 
products covered by compulsive planning was reduced from 120 
to 60 and the number of materials under state unified planning 
diminished from 256 to 26 4 . 
These measures cannot force enterprises to reduce their 
costs, to reinvest, or to prevent them from go for quick profits 
or to avoid taxes. Indeed, most of the profits has been 
distributed among the workers as bonus, making collective 
purchasing of consummer goods and construction of housing, 
or simply spent by cadres in banquets and trips. It encouraged 
the production of consummer goods which renders quick return 
of investment and fetches high prices in the market. The growth 
in industrial sector since 1984 is indeed very impressive. A Table 
shows, the speed of annual growth of total value of industry 
production between 1984-1988 is 2.77 times that of the first 
stage of reform. However, the major part of the growth come 
from industries of processing of consumer goods or those linked 
with them, while most of the basic industries are in difficult 
position. In order to keep a lid on inflation, the prices of basic 
industrial productions, such as oil and steel are still controlled 
by the government. Consequently those key industries often 
operate with loss and any further investment is detered. 
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Little progress has been realized in other crucial domains in 
the reforms of industrial and urban sector. The effort to endow 
enterprise management with more autonomy has encountered 
strong resistance from the Party apparatus and can not be 
separated from the general political reform. Reform of 
employment system has created a large body of individual or 
private enterprises but remained helpless in changing the 
situation of "iron rice bowl" situation (where the workers are 
engaged for life and wage increases according to seniority) in 
collective or state owned enterprises. And without an open 
labour market, the government could not allow major 
enterprises to go bankrupt. Thus the situation where "the job of 
three persons is done by five people", and the continuous 
subsidizing of unproductive enterprises remain unchanged. This 
impedes replacement of outdated enterprises by more efficient 
ones. 
From the beginning the Chinese Communists have always 
favored the urban population. This policy has been maintained 
after the reform. The rise in agricultural prices is cushioned by 
government subsidies to urban workers 5 , while the rise in 
production cost of industrial sector is shouldered by the key 
state enterprises. The food, cloth, coal, even soap supply for the 
urban areas are all subsidized by the government. Large scale 
unemployment is prevented by keeping surplus urban labour 
forces in urban enterprises, keeping productivity and labour 
utilization low. At the same time the rural areas keep the supply 
of cheap labour force for the service sectors and urban 
constructions. 
The same consideration hinders the reform in urban land 
and construction uses. Housing has always been heavily 
subsidized by the government. The low average wages 
reinforced resistance to more realistic rental charges while 
decentralized economic power enables massive investment in 
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construction. Construction ranks next to processing industry as 
the sectors receiving the most investment since the lauching of 
the reform. It is estimated that between 1979 and 1987 more 
than 1,644.1 billion yuan, about three times the state budget of 
1987, has been spent on it. The governmental subsidies for 
differences between procurement and urban rationed prices 
increased 5.8. times, while the state revenue increased only 34 
percent between 1978 and 1984. The urban subsidies exceeded 
the amount of 50 billion yuan in 1987 6. 
Problems Arising from Reform 
In striving for 'modernization' China has to confront 
several inherent difficulties : a very big and growing 
population, relative poor per capita natural resources, 
communication and transportation bottlenecks. Nevertheless, 
the situation is further complicated with problems resulting 
from these ten years reform. These can be summed up in three 
major inter-related issues : the 'overheated' and disequilibrium 
economic growth, inflation, and social disorder. 
Between 1978 and 1988 China has achieved one of the most 
rapid economic growth ever registered. According to the 
estimations of the World Bank, for the period 1980-1985 China's 
9.8 % growth in GNP, the fastest among all the countries 
studied, far outstriped the 2.6 % world average 7 . Chinese 
economic growth after 1985 is some 80 percent faster than in 
that period. Several factors of this "overheated" economic 
growth, as qualified by the Chinese, arouse serious concern. 
First, a suitable growth ratio should be established between 
agriculture and industry. The total agricultural output value 
has been very rapid during the first stage of reform, according 
the Table, it was about 4.5. times that of 1952-1978. However, 
during the second stage the growth of agricultural sector has 
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become negative while, at the same time, the growth of 
industrial production (including rural industries) was three 
times faster than before 1984. The burden of this overrapid 
industrial growth was borne by agriculture. The stagnation of 
the agricultural sector shows that it is not benefiting from the 
progress made in the industrial sector. At the same time the 
contradictory developments of the two sectors accentuates the 
existing clift between the urban and rural societies. On top of 
that with the drop in large proportion of marketable surplus, 
large amounts of food grain have to be imported for the 
expanding non-agricultural population and the deregulated 
population growth in the poorer areas. 
A major factor in the decline of agricultural output value is 
the rapid decrease of state and local investment. One of the 
reform project was to increase investment in agriculture from 
the level of 11.1 percent of state investment in 1979 to 18 percent 
by 1985. However, it was the contrary which had happened, 
that proportion steadily decreased. It was 5 percent in 1984 and 
3.9 percent in 1985 8 . Furthermore, under the old collective 
system a certain amount used to be deducted from the 
production for capital construction and preservation, and the 
members could be drafted for that purpose. With the 
'responsibility system' such local funds and mobilization have 
become extremely difficult or non-existant. After the first years 
of negligence China's very precarious irrigation and water 
conservation started to become seriously deteriorated. The 
same phenomena exists in soil fertility, forest and grassland 
preservation and all other local public works from road 
maintenance to health and welfare system. The sectors of 
education and 'planned birth' have also suffered from 
decreasing funds. These sectors are also affected by the craze of 
'seeking profits' where young children are productive. 
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The disequilibrium development of Chinese industrial 
growth sharpens the shortage of supply of some raw materials 
and intersectorial balance. The rapid increase of rural 
processing industries has diverted the raw material available to 
supply more efficient and productive modern factories, and 
forcing them to import or to work below their full capacity. Low 
investment in basic industries that requires long periods of 
gestation and pay off and lumpy social overhead capital has 
created shortage of some basic productive materials and energy 
supply. 
Power shortage is a serious situation after 1985. It reached 
the point where factories in several major cities such as 
Shanghai could only operate three days a week by 1989 9 . And 
much of the industrial production can only be assured with 
importation of raw materials. For instance, by April 1989, it is 
estimated that 30-40 percent of China's consumption of rolled 
steel comes from abroad. Its reliance of imports of zinc and 
rubber is even higher, and a large part of its demand for the 
raw materials of chemical fibre has to be imported. Thus, the 
higher the speed of industrial growth, the more the country has 
to import, and the more severe becomes the shortage of foreign 
exchange 1 0 . The diversion from state revenue to enterprises 
investment or expenditure, import of production materials as 
well as consumer goods, and agricultural prices and urban 
subsidies resulted in state deficits. Officially, between 1979 and 
1988, with the exception of 1985, the government ran a deficit 
now standing at 65 billion yuan (5.6 percent of national income 
in 1988) 1 1 . 
China's retail price index has risen annually since 1985. It 
culminated in 1988 with a figure of 18.5 percent higher than 
1987 1 2 . In 32 large cities, the rate was even higher : 28 percent, 
as reported by the government 1 3 . With the deregulation of 
prices for certain goods, China's covert inflation emerged into 
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the open. Several factors contributed to the persistence of 
inflation since the economic restructuring. The most important 
is the overheating which is translated into a serious inflationary 
pressure. 
An imbalance existed between the relations of social 
production and accumulation on the one hand and consumption 
on the other. In 1988 the national accumulation rate was raised 
to 37.4 percent of national income (it was 24.2 percent between 
1953 and 1957). One of the cause is the persistent high 
investment in fixed assets : 29 percent more than the budget in 
1988. The demands, especially for consumer goods has far 
outstriped that of supply. To meet the social demands and 
excessive granting of loans, Chinese banks turned to the 
over-issuance of currency. Since 1979, China's money supply 
has grown at an average annual rate of more than 20 percent, 
while the GNP has been climbing at an average of just 9.4 
percent 1 4. The over-issuance of money amounted to 67.96 billion 
yuan in 1988 raising the amount of money in circulation by 46.7 
percent between the end of 1987 and 1988. By the end of 1988, it 
is estimated that surplus public purchasing power had topped 
560 billion yuan 1 5 . 
By far the most important problem arising from the ten 
years of reform is the degeneration of social order. A multitude 
of social problems occurred with the yielding of political control 
in the rural grassroot level and encouraging of 'getting rich' as 
the paramont social moral have all been eclipsed by corruption 
and abuse of power of government officials and party cadres. 
The 'household responsibility' system favoring those with 
more ablebodied labour created visible differentiation between 
families in the same village. The appearance of 'specialized 
households' brings into being the real profound cleavage 
between the rich and the poor in the countryside. Likewise, the 
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emergence of large and profitable private enterprises in the 
urban areas created a special class of new rich. Under the 
general corrupted social ethics, people could use their wealth to 
'purchase' the right to have an extra child, to influence officials 
and even to buy points for the studies of their children. Often 
with little education and unable to find a outlet for their capital 
under the 'primary stage' socialism economic system, many 
used their profit to lead an ostentatious life. They often 
became the targets of envy and criticism, while the social 
differentiation brought on increasing occurrences of crimes of 
all kinds. 
However, the problem with the most profound social 
implications is the rampant bureaucratic corruption. That 
corruption is prevalent in the Chinese Communist Party is a 
well-known fact. Since the reform was initiated, the situation 
has deteriorated very much. As in most societies during the 
transitional process of modernization, corruption involves an 
exchange of political action for economic gain. In the case of 
China, the omnipresence of the party structure and the impass 
of separation of economic management from political power 
have enabled the officials and party cadres to make use of their 
posts for private gain. With the decentralized economic power 
and the direct control of capital by the functionaries, the 
extravagance, waste, and issuing bonuses and materials at the 
expense of the country 's interest have reached an 
unprecedented scale. Rampant power abuse and dereliction of 
duties in Mainland China has been used for economic gains 
with the "commerce craze" after 1984. The most common forms 
are graft and bribery. According to official statistics reported in 
early 1989, among those grafters who are claimed for crimes, 
nearly 53 percent are government functionaries. Of those who 
have been sentenced, about 74 percent are government 
employees 1 6 . 
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The bureaucratic profiteering has the most far-reaching 
effect on the national economy and fundamental legitimacy of 
the regime. Commercial agencies have been established not 
only by Party and government organs in charge of economic 
affairs, but also by judicial and legislative departments. With 
their authority over finance, resources distribution, production 
quotas, and commodity prices, they found it very easy to make 
money. One report claims that at the end of 1987, about 250,000 
out of total 360,000 such companies in China were engaged in 
reselling materials and goods allotted by the s ta te 1 7 . In the 
second half of 1988 a crime-reporting system established by the 
government in a special effort to crack down on them, 
registered complains about criminal actions by more than 24,000 
party and government officials, including 17 ministerial and 
provincial l eve l s 1 8 . Even if the officials are not personally 
involved in corruption many of their relatives and descendents 
of top leaders are implicated in such cases. The bureaucratic 
corruption not only created direct loss to the national economy, 
as a major economic link, the illegal reselling of materials and 
products is considered to be one of the most important factors in 
driving the prices up. 
The situation is deeply resented by the people. Several 
surveys had been conducted on the subject. 62 percent of the 
respondents of one of these surveys conducted over some three 
thousand people in Mainland China replied that they are not 
satisfied with the Chinese Communist Party, the highest rates 
of unsatisfaction are among the intellectuals, 70 percent, and 
followed by cadres 69 percent 1 9 . In August the Institute of 
Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the 
State Statistical Bureau conducted a large poll in 16 cities 
where close to 10,000 workers responded. Some 61 percent put 
the blame for the rise in lawlessness in the propensity of 
government officials to take advantage of their position to 
break the law. And a mere 24 percent of the respondents 
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believed that more people today than in the past wanted to join 
the party, while 35 percent felt the reverse 2 0 . 
There are indications that common anger against 
corruption of the bureaucrats has overshadowed differences 
among the people. More and more crimes are organized to take 
advantage from the state's. For example, 1,800 train robberies 
have been reported in the first quater of 1989, an 89 percent 
increase over the same period of 1988. Most of them involve a 
large number of people, including cadres, railway workers and 
security personnel. An interesting case is reported by Outlook 
magazine. It said that except a disabled old woman, everybody 
in a small village on the Guiyang-Kunming railline hag been 
engaged in over 40 cases of freight robbery. They not only 
receive perfect cooperation from the railway workers, but also 
have a ethic system which covers every member and their 
families 2 1. 
Inherent Limitations of Reform 
After 1978, the new leadership has been determined to 
improve the living standard of its people and in making China a 
full fledged member of a modernized world. Moreover, they 
have realized that the very survival of the regime depends upon 
the successes in these domains. However, the unwillingness and 
inability to modify some of the fundamental elements within the 
political and economic system in the Chinese Mainland has 
more or less proscribed the modernizing efforts. 
Except for short periods in the history of Chinese 
Communist, the Party has often embarked upon various 
schemes with subjective volontarism as the main instrument, 
without proper previous study of feasibility. Such tendancy 
exists from the purchase of a specific foreign factory to the 
launching of such grandiose movement as the 'Great leap 
Forward'. The economic reform is another unfortunate 
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example of such propensity. The absence of any overall plan or 
program can be detected clearly even from our brief account of 
its evolution. Admittedly, to modernize a country with an 
enormous population of low educational level, a diversed 
geographic configuration, relative poor per capita natural 
resources, and with an ossified unbalanced economic system is 
certainly a very difficult undertaking. However, rather than 
pulling all the talents and knowlege available for the task, the 
Chinese government has adopted a non-scientific and opaque 
approach. The expression often used by Chinese leaders in 
describing the manner in which their reform process advances is 
"crossing river by groping stones". 
For example, agricultural production needs timely inputs of 
market informations, funds for seeds, fertilizer, water, harvest 
as well as processing machineries, and transportation facilities. 
These needs are all the more acute when the productivity is 
increasing and when the economic units are reduced to small 
households from rural collectives. Not only the industrial 
sectors are not mobilized to meet these needs, or the bottlenecks 
of infrastructure improved, no form of farmer association or 
service system are set up to replace the roles played by the 
collective authorities. The results is that the profit margin of 
agricultural production became so low that rather than going 
through the endless trouble of meeting all these conditions, and 
pay tax or contract responsibilities, many rural people are 
obliged to abandon their alloted plots. The grain sowing areas 
has been r educed 2 2 and the output value of agricultural 
production declined. The economic system is not really regarded 
as a dynamic whole but rather as separate issues to be tackled in 
the order of facility. 
In decentralizing economic power without establishing an 
effective al ternat ive system, the government has lost 
macroeconomic control. After a period of uncertainty and 
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hesitation, the power of most international commercial 
economic interactions had been relegated to provincial 
governments. Furthermore, the opening of 'special economic 
zones' steadily expanded to include most of the coastal areas. 
The Chinese government gradually loses command over the 
types and level of technological importation, the kinds of 
industries and terms of foreign involvement on its soil. 
Moreover, there are no mechanism to prevent cut rate 
competition between different administrative regions or the 
backflow of goods originally exported from other areas. 
The replacement of the part of the economy moved from 
under 'compulsory plans' to market economy was to be 
accompanied by tax and credit mechanism. However, no 
accounting or tax system has been properly worked out. The 
newly promulgated laws are not only full of flaws but also 
disrespected. For decades Chinese had been reminded of the 
bitter days when land rent and tax existed. The resentment of 
tax collector is especially strong in the rural areas. Especially, 
when after 1985 more and more rural local governments found 
it difficult to meet their part of the contract, unable to deliver 
the fertilizer, diesel oil or seed grain as promised in the contract 
or having to give 'tiaozi' (strips of paper of I.O.U.) rather than 
cash for procurement. The task of tax collecting in the rural 
areas has become a very dangerous matter. The interwinding 
relations of political power and enterprises created numerous 
lopholes for tax evasions. The state revenue is deeply affected 
by the situation and taxation proved of no use in macro-
economic control. 
Banks failed to be an effective economic leverage. The 
decentralization made it possible for banks, like the rest of the 
society, to favor occasions that could bring in quick and large 
economic returns. Enterprises are allowed to pay back loans 
before turning in profits or tax, which encouraged social 
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spending such as construction. Furthermore, the lower interest 
rate and high inflation rate discouraged saving and thus the 
amount of bank credits. At the same time, without alternative 
producing sources, welfare or free labour market, the 
government could not afford to let large enterprises go 
bankrupcy which have to be subsidized with loans. 
The most important factor which impedes the proper 
functioning of regulations, laws and market mechanism is the 
fusion of political power and gains. The importance and basic 
principles for the separation of party and government, the 
party and economy management has been spelled out by Deng 
Xiaoping as early as August 1980 2 4 and a project (the Gengshen 
Reform Programme) has been worket out. However, real 
reform in this domain has been effectively blocked by the 
inviolability of the cardinal principles of : leadership of 
Communist Party, people's democracy, the socialist road, and 
the Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong. Other 
than the streamlining of bureaucratic structure, very little could 
have been achieved in this sphere. Attempting to put political 
reform back on the programm, the Party encouraged the 
discussion on the matter in 1986. The intellectuals' world 
started to engage in really heated debate on democracy, the 
separation of legislative, administrative and judiciary powers 
as well as freedom of opinion. The debate found its echo among 
the students. This was far beyond what the old revolutionary 
guards, who holds the real power in China's political scene 
could tolerate. The incidents resulted in the dismissal of Hu 
Yaobang as the Party Secretary, the purge of some liberals and 
the further retrenchment of the Party. 
As long as the party committee or its secretary holds the real 
power in the government and enterprises the ills of the reform 
could not be solved. There is no way to reinforce economic 
leverages such as tax, accounting and credits, or to stop 
120 
rampant bureaucratic profiteering, corruption, and nepotism. 
The government would have little funds to invest in desperately 
needed social overheads such as infrastructure, education, 
water conservation, or basic industries. By 1988 Chinese 
Communists have become fully conscious of the need for 
reajustments in economic field, but the measures taken aimed at 
maximizing the party authority. 
Retrenchment 
Various attempts to curb economic problems through price 
and wage readjustments, bank and financial regulations and 
tightening of disciplinary measures have all failed to bring 
about real improvements. In September 1988, during the third 
Plenum of the 13th Central Commit tee of the Chinese 
Communist Party the new policy of "improving the economic 
environment and stabilizing the economic order" during the 
next two years has been announced by the Party Secretary Zhao 
Ziyang. He was quite explicit in insisting that the double-track 
(planned and market) pricing system for certain products and 
materials would be maintained. And the communique issued at 
the end of the Plenum noted that China's general economic 
situation remained sound, but conceded that difficulties had 
emerged out of recent reforms. 
Throughout 1988 heated debates had been held during 
meetings initiated among independent scholars, symposiums 
sponsored by the Party, or in journalistic and academic 
publications over the best ways to deal with socio-economic ills. 
While most agree upon the need for foreign participation and 
economic development they differ very much as to the best 
approach of economic reform in China. The different views are 
reflected in the inner party discussions such as during the fourth 
Meeting of the seventh NPC Standing Committee held from 31 
October to 8 November 1988. 
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During the meeting some delegates articulated misgivings 
which a number of people had voiced. They urged the mass 
media to provide effective supervision of efforts to improve the 
domestic economy. There was criticism of disorderly economic 
conduct and government corruption, which was thought to 
have threatened the gains of the last decade, and demands for 
more stringent measures to improve the currently-inadequate 
implementation of laws and regulations 2 5. Some other members 
used the arguments of the emerging theory of 'new 
authoritarianism'. The advocates of this theory claims the 
success of the New Industrialized Countries are due to strong 
authorities enjoyed by the leaders of these regimes during the 
developing stages. Furthermore, this theory panders to the 
sentiments of the party hardliners who had not been pleased 
with the "liberal" tendance of the reform. Thus, there were calls 
to give greater powers to the central authorities in order to 
enforce the bans and prohibitions that were needed to check 
price rises and other inflationary pressures 2 6. 
Under the policy of 'improvement and stabilization' the 
three immediate major task are : major reduction in fixed 
investment and strict control of consumption funds; the 
formation of clear industrial policy; and comprehensive reforms 
(aiming at slowing down price reform, but accelerating 
enterprise reform and improvement in macro-economic 
control). Zhao Ziyang saw the readjustment of China's 
economic structure, including the complete separation of 
political power and economic enterprises 2 5 , as the key to the 
policy. As for Li Peng, the new Prime Minister of the State 
Council, noted in the end of November 1988, that if economic 
methods proved ineffective as means of fulfilling desired 
objectives, then 'administrative' (a euphemism for high handed 
political pressure) methods - "including some effective means 
which we used in the past" - would be adopted 2 6. 
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Policy and measures of 'improvement and stabilization' 
have had little effects. As a popular saying goes, "the lower 
levels have counter-measures for whatever policy taken by the 
higher authority". The investment in capital construction in 
1988 was still 20 percent higher than 1987. Many of the 
suspended projects had been created for just such occasions, 
and some scraped projects are essential to the economic 
development. Consumption funds have continued to expand. In 
February 1989, they stood at 20 billion yuan more than 12 
months earlier. Tax evasion is practised by an estimated 70 
percent of industrial and commercial enterprises. Since the 
stipulation on taxation of collective banquet expenses, between 
September 1988 and March 1989, the state has only collected 
470,000 yuan — about the tax payment of a medium restaurant 
for one y e a r 2 9 . And with the combined effects of price 
adjustment, over issuance of currency and decreased industrial 
growth the inflation rate would not be able to be controlled 
within 10 percent in 1989 as planned 3 0 . The disequilibrium 
between industrial and agricultural sectors increased from the 
difference of three folds in 1987 to 7 folds in 1988. 
By 1989, there were increasing evidences that Zhao Ziyang 
had been relieved of responsibility in economic work, and the 
advocates of 'new authoritarianism' were gaining upper hands 
as the solution to China's problems. In his report to the Second 
Session of National People's Congress held in April 1989, Li 
Peng openly recognized that mistakes had been committed in 
economic reform. This was a direct criticism to policies and 
measures decided under the leadership of Zhao Ziyang. Policies 
for further reform previously announced such as : reforms of 
housing and market system; joint-stock, stock market, 
bankrupcy and merger in enterprises reform, as well as the 
changing of personnel and participation of more non-partisans 
123 
in the government had all been suspended. The economic 
reform had effectively came to a halt. The emphasis was to 
"conpress social demands without vacilation". 
At the same time, politically, the party has repeatedly 
stressed the need of 'stability and unity'. Fearful of social 
instability for the seventieth anniversary of the first student 
movement on the Fourth of May and other major occasions in 
1989, the government started to give instructions concerning 
the content and tones of all public pronouncement and media 
publication at the end of 1988 3 1 . Such tight control of political 
expression without waging of political campaign, such as 
'spiritual pollution' or 'bourgeois liberalism' is unprecedented 
since 1978. It seems that, unable to retract the decentralized 
economic powers to remedy socio-economic problems after the 
ten years of reform, the Chinese leaders are trying to regain 
their power through the reinforcement of authority. 
Conclusion 
Ten years of economic reform has brought 'growth' to 
China, although an unbalanced and disequilibrius one. An 
average annual growth of 14.4 percent of national income for 
ten years is indeed a remarkable achievement for a country with 
so many people to feed and such a vast territory to govern. 
Nevertheless, the result is a far cry from the real 'development' 
that China was seeking. David E. Apter has defined 
development as the "structuralization of political-socio-
economic activit ies" which has the character is t ics of 
systemization, rationalization, legalization, specialization, 
p l an i f i ca t ion 3 2 . The reform of China has missed all these 
attributions. It is not surprising that such 'growth' arouses 
many problems and could not be maintained. 
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The agricultural sector is the first to have gone through the 
cycle of rapid growth and decline. Its growth up to 1984 had 
been acquired through a rationalization of land and human 
resources utilization. Once the pent up productivities had been 
released and the reserve of the last 30 years (especially in 
capital construction) had been exhausted the downswing 
became inevitable. The sector needs enourmous amount of 
investment and reorganization to stop the continuous decline. 
To a large measure, the brisk growth of industrial output since 
1985 has benefited from funds diverted from agricultural sector 
through unbalanced price and investment system as well as 
from national and international credits. Furthermore, its 
growth comes from the sacrifice of productivity. Compared 
with 1979, the proportion of non-rural industrial output value 
in total national production decreased 1.3 percent, while at the 
same time the proportion of all employment increased 4.6 
percent. And the margin of investment-productivity benefit has 
also declined, it dropped 15 percent in one single year of 1986 3 3 . 
This ten years' reform has added more problems to the 
already precarious state of China's economy. It is probably 
more difficult to attain the goal of 'modernization' even if 
China is to embark on a more rational path now than it was in 
the last ten years. Less than 20 percent of China's high 
investment in the last ten years has gone on developing energy, 
transport, communicat ions and important raw material 
resources 3 4 . The meager growth of these basic industries and 
infrastructure sets the limit to future development. By 
neglecting these sectors China would have great difficulties in 
absorbing the large army of young people who would come into 
the labour market and the surplus workforce of the rural area. 
The development of human resources is also more than 
disappointing. Education has been so neglected that even Deng 
Xiaoping admitted that is the biggest mistake of the r e f o r m . 
The population growth which was to be contained by the policy 
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of 'one child per couple' has become out of the governmental 
control after the stringent campaign of 1983-84. However, 
more than the growth, the underegistration or the disobedience 
of the people, it is the sign of discredit of the 'planned birth' 
propaganda and methods such as 'reward and sanction' in the 
eyes of both the cadres and the people which is more significant 
in the socio-political environment of China. 
Another factor that would make China's modernization 
effort even more difficult is the worsening environmental 
situation. Such problems as the shrinking of forest and water 
surface, soil erosion, and the expansion of desert and salined 
land have already increased the frequency of natural disasters, 
the shortage of water and arable land. Ten years of high and 
random consumption growth increased the speed of 
deterioration. Uncontrolled extraction of natural resources by a 
multitude of small workshops and village industries has done 
great damage to many mineral deposit. The great majority of 
them have so little capital that they could not afford 
installations against pollution and further deteriorated China's 
natural environment. Factories and housing constructions have 
taken up precious arable land. They have also added to the 
problem of pollution. 
However, at least one element in the reform will bring and 
has brought profound changes to the mentality of the Chinese 
people, that is the opening to the outside world. Contact with 
the advanced countries bring with it the realization of the 
backwardness of China and the urgency of catching up. 
Knowledge of countries which managed to 'development' in a 
large sense has also deeply shocked the Chinese into action. 
Some tens of thousands of students and scholars have visited or 
studied in other countries. This has opened widely the sight of 
some of the most brilliant people who had been confined in 
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China's powerful propaganda machineries. The benefits of an 
open society has convinced many people. 
Chinese people have put forward the demand for 
democracy, freedom of the press, and scientific approach 
because only with all the right elements can societies be 'able to 
choose a direction and means of change ' 3 6 in the process of 
development. It has always been one person or a little group of 
people who dictated 'the best and the only way' for China. And 
it has been proven that mistakes have been committed 
repeatedly. Ten years after the economic reform the economic 
ills are profound, the Chinese people confront economic 
difficulties everyday in the form of inflation, in self-fulfillment 
as in education, in the future in the form of employment and 
opportunites. During the whole movement of 'democracy' in 
spring 1989, neither the student nor the workers or ordinary 
citizens expressed complaints only about the economy. Beyond 
the noble appeal of 'freedom' and 'democracy' may be they are 
also aware of that 'choice' implies rationality and that debate 
and informations are caracteristics and prerequisites of 
modernity. 
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RESUME 
Sous la direction de Deng Xiaoping, la Chine a entamé la 
réforme économique la plus audacieuse jamais lancée dans un 
régime communiste auparavant. Entre 1978 et 1988, le revenu 
national de la Chine a augmenté avec une vitesse annuelle de 
14%, plus de deux fois plus importante que celle enregistrée 
entre 1952 et 1978, et bien plus vite que la moyenne de 3 % de 
croissance mondiale. La croissance est enregistrée aussi bien 
dans le secteur de la production agraire que dans ceux des 
industries légère et lourde. Mais cet article vise à démontrer 
que cette croissance économique a apporté beaucoup de 
problèmes et que, en réalité, dix ans après le lancement de cette 
réforme, le vrai 'développement' de la Chine sera bien plus 
difficile qu'avant. 
Ce phénomène est fortement lié à l'évolution menée de la 
réforme, dans laquelle le premier stade est caractérisé par 
l'abandon de l'intention originale et son remplacement par le 
développement spontané dans la campagne du système de la 
'responsabilité' par foyer ou individuel et par la propulsion de 
cette formule dans la zone urbaine et dans le secteur de 
l'industrie. Dans ce processus, la 'libéralisation' est devenue 
synonyme de 'profit' et elle dépouille la réforme de ce qu'elle 
contenait en fait de programme. Très vite, de nombreux 
problèmes ont surgi comme la surchauffe et le déséquilibre des 
économies, l'inflation et des désordres sociaux. 
Le manque d'un plan global démontre la caractéristique du 
volontarisme qui représente une des limitations inhérentes au 
parti communiste chinois. La décentralisation non-coordonnée 
et, à défaut, l'utilisation de mécanismes qui remplacent les 
contraintes précédentes de l 'économie centralisée, ont eu 
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comme résul tat la perte du contrôle central de la 
macroéconomie. L'impasse dans le domaine de la réforme 
polit ique a b loqué l 'exécution effective des nouvel les 
d ispos i t ions économiques et a créé des désordres 
socio-politiques. 
Vers 1988, le débat au sein des instances centrales du parti 
pour résoudre les difficultés économiques s'est déroulé suivant 
deux lignes : la première préconise de pousser plus loin la 
réforme, ce qui implique la nécessité d'une réforme politique; la 
deuxième appuie l'assainissement qui restitue la plupart des 
contrôles politiques au parti communiste comme avant la 
réforme. En 1989, le tr iomphe de ceux qui prônent 
l'assainissement devient évident. 
Le manque de "caractéristiques de systématisation, 
rationalisation, légalisation, spécialisation et planification dans 
la structuration des activités politico-socio-économies", la 
définition donnée par David E. Apter pour le 'développement', 
pendant ces dix années de réforme et de croissance économique 
chinoises est frappant. Les p rob lèmes de gou lo t s 
d 'étranglements existants dans les industries de base , 
l'infrastructure et l'irrigation, le développement des matières 
premières, ainsi que le développement des ressources humaines, 
et la politique de planification des naissances ont tous subi 
encore des régressions très importantes. De plus, la situation 
déjà alarmante de l'environnement et de la pollution s'est 
énormément aggravée avec la croissance économique. 
Mais l'ouverture vers le monde extérieur et les dizaines de 
milliers d'étudiants et de professionnels qui ont effectué des 
séjours à l'étranger ont apporté des changements profonds 
dans la mentalité de beaucoup de Chinois. C'est notre souhait 
que derrière les nobles demandes de liberté et de démocratie 
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pendant le mouvement de 'démocratisation' du printemps 1989, 
existe aussi la prise de conscience que des débats et une 
information l ibres sont des condi t ions préalables du 
développement. 
